If a contract does not contain provisions for other agreements or measures, only the text of the treaty is legally binding. In general, an amendment to the Treaty only commits the States that have ratified it and the agreements reached at review conferences, summits or meetings of the States Parties are not legally binding. The Charter of the United Nations is an example of a treaty that contains provisions for other binding agreements. By signing and ratifying the Charter, countries have agreed to be legally bound by resolutions adopted by UN bodies such as the General Assembly and the Security Council. Therefore, UN resolutions are legally binding on UN member states and no signature or ratification is required. See z.B. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 J. Int`l L. 115, 124-28 (2005) (Debate on Uncertainties Related to Customary International Law). See also Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“It is often difficult to determine what constitutes the customary law of the peoples, which defines international customary law, and how firmly a standard must be entrenched in order to be considered a standard of habit of peoples.”) who were repealed for unrelated reasons of Al Bahlul against the United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (in bench). As printing resources have been migrated online, it is now possible to complete the first two or three steps of the contract search process using an online contract database, such as the HeinOnline Treaty and Accords Library, HeinOnline`s World Library Treaty or the U.N. Treaty Series Online. The formal confirmation act – is synonymous with ratification when an international organization declares its consent to the contract. Compare Bradford C. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1573, 1661 (2007) (arguing that the text and history of the Constitution support the position that treaties and executive agreements are not interchangeable, and also argue that the supreme clause should be read in order to avoid, in general, exclusive executive agreements being contrary to existing legislation); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1249-67 (1995) (on the grounds that the contractual clause is the exclusive means for Congress to approve important international agreements); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional Executive Agreements, 99 Me. L. Rev. 757, 852 (2001) (on the grounds that treaties are the constitutional form required for Congress to approve an international agreement on measures outside the constitutional powers of Congress, including human rights, political/military alliances and arms control issues, but are not necessary for agreements of measures within the competence of Congress, such as the International Trade Agreement. B). With third restatement, see 1, 303 n.8 (“Previously, it was argued that certain agreements could only be concluded in the form of contracts under the constitutional procedure. The scientific opinion rejected this view.” Henkin, supra note 22, at 217 (“Whatever its theoretical advantages, it is now widely accepted that the Executive Agreement of Congress is available for broad use, including for general use, and is a complete alternative to a contract.
. . . “); Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1244 (affirms that “the weight of scientific opinion” has been regarded since the 1940s in favour of the idea that congressional contracts and executive agreements are interchangeable); Bruce Ackerman – David Golove, IS NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv.
